New modes of political participation and Singapore's nominated members of parliament by Rodan, G.
MURDOCH RESEARCH REPOSITORY
http://researchrepository.murdoch.edu.au
This is the author's final version of the work, as accepted for publication following peer review but without the
publisher's layout or pagination.
Rodan, G. (2009) New modes of political participation and Singapore's nominated members of
parliament. Government and Opposition, 44 (4). pp. 438-462.
http://researchrepository.murdoch.edu.au/1118
Copyright © The Author 2009. Journal compilation © 2009 Government and Opposition Ltd
It is posted here for your personal use. No further distribution is permitted.
http://tweaket.com/CPGenerator/?id=1118
1 of 1 28/04/2010 3:30 PM
 New Modes of Political Participation and Singapore’s Nominated 
Members of Parliament  
Garry Rodan∗ 
Abstract 
Despite growing recognition that authoritarianism can be far more durable than transition 
theorists previously expected, transition theory assumptions continue to constrain attempts to 
understand authoritarian regimes. In particular, alternative avenues of political participation 
to opposition political parties and electoral contests are under examined. Singapore’s 
authoritarian regime involves a range of such innovative institutional and ideological 
initiatives, one of the most significant being the Nominated Members of Parliament scheme. 
This promotes notions of representation different from democratic parliamentary 
representation which are not without appeal to targeted, emerging social forces. Singapore’s 
political economy dynamics contribute to this responsiveness by obstructing independent 
power bases. 
 
Key Words: authoritarianism; representation; democratization; civil society; political 
regime; political institutions. 
 
 
Introduction 
After decades of transition theorists’ preoccupation with when, how and why transformations 
to liberal democracy occur, the inability of this framework to anticipate or understand the 
enduring and dynamic nature of authoritarian rule came under critical notice.1 Yet as some 
writers respond to the challenge of taking the durability of authoritarianism more seriously, 2 
the transition theory assumption about the analytical primacy of strategic choices of 
incumbent elites and focus on a comparatively narrow range of political institution persists. 
So too does the failure to examine how inter-relationships between variables are influenced 
by dynamic power relations and interests associated with capitalist development. Even where 
analyses of institutional choices made by incumbent elites take greater account of the 
systemic effects of structural and historical factors,3 this does not extend to a full recognition 
that conflicts and alliances rooted in political economy fundamentally shape how and where 
state power is exercised.4 Consequently, while recent work from both these approaches 
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significantly enhances our appreciation of the factors mediating the extent and impact of 
manipulation of elections and political parties within authoritarian regimes, it is not much 
interested in, nor able to adequately explain, the expansion of political participation through 
creative institutional and ideological alternatives to electoral competition.  
Analytical bias towards elections and parties is explained by Gandhi on the basis that 
‘the institutional inventiveness of dictators is most apparent when they govern within 
nominally democratic institutions, such as legislatures and political parties,’5 while Brownlee 
contends that elections ‘are the autocrat’s latest fashion.’6 But while the incorporation of 
elections and parties into authoritarian strategies of cooption are undeniably important, 
whether this is the only fashion – or even the most important and inventive fashion – among 
authoritarian regimes is open to challenge. New modes of political participation are 
increasingly emerging as alternatives to opposition parties and electoral competition in the 
strategies of authoritarian regime reproduction, from the world’s most populous authoritarian 
regimes in China to one of the smallest in Singapore. This includes policy deliberations 
between authorities and citizens, deliberative budgeting procedures, as well as formal 
complaints and grievance mechanisms.7 Jayasuriya and Rodan have argued that, through 
these innovative institutional developments, more political participation and less contestation 
can go hand in hand.8 
According to Geddes, ‘Relatively few authoritarian regimes have hit upon a formula 
for successful and stable inclusionary authoritarianism.’9 However, Singapore under the 
People’s Action Party (PAP) certainly qualifies – both in terms of harnessing nominally 
democratic institutions and in creating new institutions outside and inside Parliament. For 
leaders of other authoritarian regimes seeking to ensure social changes ensuing from 
advanced capitalist development do not translate into effective pressures for political 
liberalization, the PAP experience offers encouragement, if not inspiration. Yet while 
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Levitsky’s and Way’s depiction of Singapore as a ‘façade electoral regime’ where ‘electoral 
institutions exist but yield no meaningful contestation for power’ is descriptively accurate, it 
doesn’t capture the institutional and ideological means by which political elites attempt to 
reproduce authoritarianism in Singapore have been changing, nor why this is happening.10   
An especially significant part of this process is the development of non-democratic 
structures and notions of representation. Gandhi argues that the presence of legislatures and 
parties within authoritarian regimes offers ‘little in the way of representation and 
accountability to participants and ordinary citizens.’11 However, it is not the objective of the 
PAP to institutionalize democratic representation and accountability but viable alternatives to 
them – something unexplored in the general literature on authoritarian regimes. The nature 
and purpose of representation remains the subject of continuing debate among theorists of 
liberal democracy. Hobbes underlined the importance of formal authorization of 
representatives; Burke the substantive virtue and expert knowledge of the representative; and 
Jefferson the importance of participation by the representative. Arguments are now surfacing 
about the importance of range and competition in representation.12 This alone should caution 
against being instantly dismissive of the PAP’s institutional and ideological innovations in 
representation.  
The PAP promotes ideas of representation through various new modes of political 
participation. However, it is through the Nominated Members of Parliament (NMP) scheme 
that the concept of representation has been most explicitly articulated. This initiative is not 
intended to harness electoral politics and opposition parties to authoritarian reproduction, but 
is another element of the broader project of actively fostering alternatives to such competitive 
politics based on democratic representation. This essay attempts to identify exactly what 
notions of representation are embodied in the NMP scheme, why this is happening and what 
the implications are for the regime. Given that the People’s Alliance for Democracy in 
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Thailand – which has mobilized against two elected governments and supported a military 
coup against one – is pushing for a parliament that is 70 per cent appointed, a look at attempts 
to develop non-democratic notions of representation in Singapore has a wider practical and 
theoretical significance. 
At one level, the NMP scheme gives new expression to a longstanding ideology of 
technocracy that previous analysts of the PAP have observed. Barr,13 in particular, has 
already provided a rich account of how ruling elite rhetoric claiming reason, objectivity and 
the insulation of vested interests characterize processes at all levels of political and 
bureaucratic decision-making in Singapore.14 Importantly, he points out that despite personal 
connections and privilege being intrinsic to the way that power is actually exercised, this 
legitimating ideology has serious traction because there is enough ‘truth in the myths of 
meritocracy, elite governance and pragmatism to ensure that the city-state is stable and 
profitable.’15 At another level, though, how the PAP is adapting and institutionalizing this 
ideology through new state-controlled modes of political participation is largely unexplored – 
especially as it involves ideas of representation. We now witness an attempt to more 
systematically embed the technocratic idea that politics is fundamentally a problem-solving 
exercise requiring logical solutions and expertise; not a struggle over normative goals.  
The argument here is that the NMP scheme attempts to extend and reconcile 
technocratic ideas about governance, on the one hand, with a political objective of strategic 
inclusion of diverse and emerging social forces to pre-empt oppositional politics gaining from 
their concerns, on the other hand. In particular, representation is meant to structure political 
participation in such a way as to bypass or control intermediary organizations and, in so 
doing, limit the sorts of conflicts permissible in the political process. This new phase in 
authoritarianism, and the prospects of it achieving ruling party goals, must be understood in 
relation to Singapore’s dynamic political economy – not least the consolidation and extension 
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of state capitalism, which has helped entrench interests served by a technocratic ideology and 
militated against new independent economic and social bases for political opposition. The 
scope for political cooption, reflected in the growing appeal of the NMP scheme – especially 
among the professional middle class – and some tensions it generates within the PAP itself 
reflect this structural context. 
 
Authoritarian Consensus and the NMP Rationale 
The stirrings of a refinement to the authoritarian regime in Singapore were first in evidence 
by the early 1980s following a 12.9 per cent swing against the government at the 1984 
general election. Within hours of the polls closing, Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew raised the 
spectre of watering down the one-person-one-vote system to prevent a future toppling of the 
PAP.16 What subsequently transpired, though, was a more sophisticated strategy for limiting 
the threat to the PAP’s stranglehold on power involving new avenues for political 
participation.  
This has included government parliamentary committees, major government policy 
reviews and vision statements, and the establishment in 1985 of the Feedback Unit – renamed 
in 2006 REACH, or Reaching Everyone for Active Citizenry @ Home.17 All are examples of 
state-sponsored administrative incorporation, a specific mode of political participation 
depicting political problems as issues of administrative delivery and efficiency in public 
policy. Administrative accountability may be increased in the process, but the forms of 
political conflict permissible within these modes is highly constrained and deliberately 
steered away from party politics and political competition more generally. Such fragmented 
political processes expressly marginalize independent, intermediary organizations – either in 
favour of multiple individual forms of participation or by working with state-defined and 
endorsed groups deemed relevant to public policy. However, new state-sponsored modes of 
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political participation in Singapore also extend to societal incorporation, under which various 
forms of non-governmental-organization participation is provided for, including by genuinely 
independent organizations.18  
Arguably the most significant new mode of political participation in Singapore is 
precisely such an innovation, namely the NMP scheme. This institution hovers on the 
conceptual border between administrative and societal incorporation, fostering avenues for 
political participation by individuals in their own right, as members of state-conceived social 
categories and as members of independent social groups. The NMP scheme is also significant 
in operating within an established mode of participation – the Parliament. This highlights the 
complex layering that can involve new modes of political participation, sometimes 
superimposed on an existing mode of participation and with implications for how the latter 
functions.  
NMPs are appointed by the President for terms of up to two-and-half years on the 
advice of a Special Select Committee appointed by Parliament.19 In contrast with elected 
MPs, they cannot vote on money bills, bills to alter the Constitution, or motions of no 
confidence in the government. However, they can speak on these issues and vote and speak 
on any other bills and motions. Even among government MPs, the scheme initially proved 
contentious when it was introduced as a parliamentary bill in November 1989. Indeed, in 
order to allay concerns within its own ranks, the government’s bill required that each new 
Parliament would have to approve the continuation of the appointment of NMPs. Yet not 
only has that approval been secured without exception thereafter, but in 1997 the number of 
NMPs allowed for was increased from the original maximum of six to up to nine.  
 In explaining the need for NMPs, Prime Minister Goh sought to address what he saw 
as a public misconception that the PAP was closed to alternative points of view on policy. It 
was clear that he didn’t consider the views advanced through opposition political parties as 
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valuable to policy deliberations. NMPs were therefore intended to be non-partisan and 
‘concentrate on the substance of the debate rather than the form and rhetoric’.20 The 
legislation altering the Constitution referred to ‘independent and non-partisan views’ in the 
selection criteria for NMPs.21 Deputy Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong also expressed the 
hope that NMPs would help arrest the increasing support for opposition candidates.22 
Significantly, though, Goh made mention not only of the value of incorporating talented 
people with special expertise in the professions, commerce, industry, social services, cultural 
domains but also of sections of society currently under-represented in Parliament, including 
women.  
From the outset, then, the rationale for NMPs straddled a couple of arguments: one 
was the elitist and technocratic argument that the Parliament needed apolitical experts who 
could help elevate debate beyond combative engagement towards constructive public policy 
contributions;23 the other was the admission, in effect, that various social interests and 
segments of society were under-represented and needed to be more effectively incorporated 
into Parliament – presumably to pre-empt their drift to oppositional politics.  
 By the standards of Singapore’s Parliament, the NMP bill aroused exceptional 
controversy. Not surprisingly, opposition parties saw the scheme as an attempt by the ruling 
party to further marginalize by stacking Parliament with pro-PAP stooges. Yet many PAP 
backbenchers were also concerned that this initiative would erode their own status as 
representatives, almost one-third of PAP MPs expressing opposition to the scheme when the 
bill was first introduced into Parliament. There was no more concerted PAP critic of the NMP 
proposal than Tan Cheng Bock. Tan was chairman of the Feedback Unit from 1985-89, so 
was a strong supporter of new modes of political participation. However, he voted against the 
NMP scheme in every Parliament until he retired, principally on the basis that NMPs were 
not accountable to any constituency. Meanwhile, his PAP colleagues soon came to accept the 
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scheme as part of the wider set of institutional innovations meant to protect the PAP from a 
transition towards a more competitive party system. 
 
Absorbing Social Interests 
Since the first two appointments of NMPs to Parliament in 1990, the scheme has expanded 
significantly to involve 48 different people and a total of 59 appointments, with some NMPs 
serving more than one term. The complexion of appointments suggests they have been 
intended to both supplement existing mechanisms of political co-option, particularly in regard 
to labour and ethnic minorities, and to provide avenues for absorbing emerging social forces 
among business and middle classes associated with Singapore’s advanced capitalist 
development. The scheme has also proven to be a dynamic one, with shifts in the emphasis of 
appointments reflecting changing PAP perceptions on the forces and issues warranting 
political accommodation or engagement.  
 In an attempt to capture the chief characteristics and dynamics of the various NMP 
appointments since the beginning of the scheme in June 1990 through to the eleventh 
Parliament beginning in November 2006, Table 1 identifies these on the basis of interest 
groups or sectors. The individuals involved can generally be depicted as principally 
belonging to one or other interest group or sector, but many straddle these categories. This 
would appear to be a strategy by the Parliamentary Select Committee responsible for the 
appointments to simultaneously incorporate or address different target interest groups and 
sectors. 
Table 1: Single and Multiple Categorization of NMPs by Sector 
Parliament NTUC Academia Professionals Business Women Societal Ethnicity Youth 
11th 2006— 1  2 (1) 1 (1) 1 (1)    (4) 1 (1)    (2) 2 (1)  
10th 2002—2006 2  2 (2) 2 (2) 6 (3)    (8) 1 (1)    (2) 2 (2)  
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9th 1997—2001 2  1  2 (2) 5 (1)    (1) 2  1 (3)  
8th 1992—1996 2  2  2 (3) 3 (1) 1 (1)    (2) 1 (1)  
7th 1989—1991   1  1 (1)     
 Sub-totals 7  7 (3) 8 (8) 16 (7) 1 (14) 4 (4) 2 (8) 4 (3) 
 Total 7 10 16 23 15 7 10 7 
Bracketed figures refer to the cross-categorizations of NMPs and are additional to un-bracketed primary 
categorizations.  
Note also that some NMPs have been appointed in more than one Parliament so they are counted for each 
Parliament.  
 
One of the striking themes has been a sustained bias towards inclusion of people from the 
professions and academia, with medical and legal professionals especially prominent.24 
Whether by single or multiple categorizations of NMPs, academics and professionals 
collectively account respectively for 32 per cent and 25 per cent of all NMP appointments. In 
addition to being appointed in their own right, academics and professionals have often been 
appointed as notional representatives of women, ethnic minorities or as champions of 
environmentalism or social welfare. In this way, the link between formal educational 
credentials and public policy expertise is reinforced at the same time as functional groups are 
politically incorporated. This evidences elitist and functional premises of the PAP’s 
technocratic ideology. 
The most heavily ‘represented’ single category of NMPs has involved the business 
sector, accounting for 31 per cent of the single and 22 per cent of the multiple 
categorizations. What is especially significant in these appointments is the repeated 
incorporation of senior past or present figures from within peak employer and business 
bodies.25 Historically, the PAP was apprehensive about the potential the domestic private 
sector represented for an independent political base that might be exploited by political 
opponents.26 Yet while state capitalism may have subsequently eroded that potential capacity, 
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Singapore’s increasing exposure to economic globalization has brought continuing challenges 
for the private sector. The consolidation and expansion of government-linked-companies 
(GLCs) has not been without its critics from the local business community either.   
 The starkest use of NMP appointments in an implicit admission that existing 
mechanisms of political cooption are no longer sufficient involves state-controlled trade 
unions. Since the eighth Parliament there have been seven separate appointments of senior 
officials from the PAP-affiliated NTUC, including: two vice-presidents, John De Payva and 
Nithiah Nandan; the Director of the Industrial Relations Department, Cham Hui Fong; and 
Secretary for Financial Affairs, Teo Yock Ngee. The unions whose secretary-generals or 
executive-secretaries have comprised the seven NMPs traverse public and private sectors as 
well as utilities and manufacturing industries. As the PAP has more vigorously embraced 
economic globalization in recent decades, material inequalities have widened significantly in 
Singapore, testing trade union officials’ ability to represent workers’ interests to the 
government.27 Increasingly exorbitant ministerial and senior civil servant salaries justified in 
elitist terms have only compounded resentment within the working class about rising 
inequalities. The generous representation of the NTUC in NMP appointments might thus be 
seen as a symbolic statement to counteract the idea of NTUC impotence.   
 Among the most fascinating appointments are those in the three categories in Table 1 
of Women, Societal and Ethnicity, since these have been the areas involving embryonic civil 
society organizations. The number of appointments principally to incorporate ‘constituents’ 
under these categories has not been substantial, but they have been strategic. Moreover, when 
we take into account crossover with other appointments it becomes clear that the Select 
Committee has been keen to project the idea that the concerns and interests of advocacy 
groups can be accommodated through the NMP scheme.  
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 The appointment of orthopedic surgeon Kanwaljit Soin to the eighth Parliament was a 
conspicuous attempt to encourage activists within the feminist Association of Women for 
Action and Research (AWARE) towards direct engagement within a PAP-controlled 
institution. Soin was a founding member and President of AWARE, which was established in 
1985 as a genuinely independent organization seeking to influence public opinion and policy. 
Whilst its reform agenda has been moderate, its independence and preparedness to focus on 
issues such as domestic violence and discrimination against women in the civil service, which 
opposition parties had not yet seriously pursued, appeared to render it a priority target in PAP 
cooption strategies in the early years of the NMP scheme. The articulate Soin did much to 
give the NMP scheme credibility. She dominated parliamentary question time and 
occasionally shaped public debate, as in 1995 when she introduced a private member’s bill – 
The Family Violence Bill. Although this was defeated, Soin reflected that:  
The media took up the subject of family violence in an earnest and responsible way and gave 
it a great deal of coverage, and this contributed to increased general awareness of the 
issue…Also the government made amendments to the Women’s Charter and these 
incorporated many of the principles and concepts of the aborted Family Violence Bill.28 
 
Soin reasoned that, ‘in Singapore’s achievement-oriented society,’ being a surgeon ‘added a 
little more weight to what I had to say’.29 However, she not only endorsed the NMP scheme 
in view of the existing limits to political space, but also declared that: ‘Even if a bipartisan 
system should eventually evolve here, there will still be a role for non-partisan NMPs to add 
another perspective to issues’.30 
 Another president of AWARE, Braema Mathiaparanam, successfully applied to be an 
NMP after centring her AWARE-supported application around foreign domestic labour 
advocacy. Braema was foundation President of the Transient Workers Count Too (TWC2), 
an organization that was officially registered in 2004 but which had informally existed since 
March 2003 under the title of The Working Committee 2. Its initial focus was the plight of 
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foreign domestic workers in Singapore, subsequently broadened to issues facing migrant 
workers generally. Banned from joining unions and with minimal legal or other 
institutionalized rights, migrant workers are vulnerable in Singapore. It is remarkable how 
little attention their conditions have received from opposition parties.  
Appointments of women from other sectors could also be projected as further 
accommodation to women’s issues. For instance, academic Kelyani K. Mehta has conducted 
research on the interrelated domains of women, families and the elderly. The incorporation 
into Parliament of successful business figures such as Claire Chiang and Olivia Lum also 
serves in a different way to broaden the scope for female participation in parliamentary 
debate.   
 Another of the few independent advocacy groups in Singapore, the Nature Society of 
Singapore (NSS), has also been recognized through the appointment of orthopedic surgeon 
Geh Min, who was not only the first female president of the NSS but also a past president of 
AWARE. Again, like AWARE and TWC2, while not a radical organization, NSS’s 
independence and comparative activism from the late 1980s posed a question about the 
adequacy of existing structures of political cooption on issues of potential appeal to 
Singapore’s expanding middle class. While the Societies Act barred social organizations from 
forging links with opposition parties, the NMP scheme appeared in part intended to obviate 
the desire for such a direction. 
The importance of officially sponsored conceptions of ethnic identity and 
consciousness to the PAP’s political strategies has long translated into structures of political 
cooption through the state and ruling party. However, for Singapore’s ethnic minorities this 
cooption has not been without its controversy. In 1991, the independent Association of 
Muslim Professionals (AMP) was established out of frustration with Mendaki, the officially 
sanctioned council representing ethnic Malays and controlled by Malay PAP MPs. Many 
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Malays saw Mendaki as inadequately representing the interests of the Malay community. 
Subsequently, among the 1994 NMP appointments was AMP Chairman Imram bin 
Mohamed. PAP tolerance of AMP independence is in part a function of ruling party 
preference for problems of socio-economic disadvantage being viewed through an ethnic 
rather than a class prism. But the AMP’s attempts to test this tolerance have been instructive. 
In 2000, the AMP proposed replacing Mendaki’s monopoly of official Malay representation 
with a ‘collective leadership’ comprising ‘independent non-political’ Malays. The AMP 
claimed this would be consistent with the spirit of ‘active citizenship’ being promoted by then 
Prime Minister Goh.31 However, the idea got short shrift, with Goh warning the AMP not to 
stray into the political arena and it promptly retreated.32  
 The only other explicit ethnic minority appointment has been Shriniwas Rai, a lawyer 
and author of The Common Heritage: A Survey of Hindi Words in Malay, published in 1987. 
In 1988, Shriniwas assisted the Singapore North Indian Hindu Association in preparing 
materials relating to the debate over a PAP-proposed national ideology, which subsequently 
translated into the Shared Values legislation. However, through the appointments of Kelyani 
K. Mehta, who was on the Executive Committee of the Singapore Indian Development 
Association (SINDA) between 1994 and 1997, as well as Braema Mathiaparanam, Kanwaljit 
Soin, Zulfiki bin Baharudin and Eunice Olsen, the Select Committee has been able to include 
ethnic Indians, Malays and Eurasians to project an inclusive attitude towards minority ethnic 
communities. 
 Finally, nothing better illustrates how changing PAP perceptions of its own political 
challenges affects appointments than the category loosely referred to in Table 1 as ‘Youth’. 
This has involved two appointments in each of the last two parliaments, including the re-
appointment of Eunice Olsen – television show host, volunteer youth worker, part-time 
musician, 2000 beauty queen and winner of the 2006 Singapore Youth Award. Born in 1977, 
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Olsen became in October 2006 the youngest person to enter Singapore Parliament. Also 
appointed to the tenth Parliament was Patricia Soh-Khim Ong, a Ph D in mechanical 
engineering and the recipient of the 2004 Singapore Youth Award for Science and 
Technology. Meanwhile, lawyer and political blogger, Siew Kum Hong, entered the eleventh 
Parliament in 2006 as a thirty-one year-old with the most obvious background of interest in 
political affairs. Each emanating from different social milieu, collectively these NMPs give 
expression to the rapidly changing age demographic of the Singapore electorate. At the most 
recent general election, around 40 per cent of eligible voters were born after Singapore 
became an independent nation in 1965.33 The PAP has therefore recently begun to explore 
new mechanisms and approaches to more effectively guard against future erosion of its vote 
from so-called Generation X (born between 1965 and 1982) and Generation Y (born between 
1983 and 1994). 
Rapidly-developing capitalism in Singapore had generated new issues and conflicts. 
Amonst other things, these related to the effects of fuller exposure to globalization on 
different social and ethnic groups, the treatment of guest workers, the changing role and 
expectations of women inside and outside the workforce and concerns about the environment. 
The PAP did not want this to create opportunities for the development of independent civil 
society organizations or opposition parties.  
A key factor in the ability of the PAP to attract different notional representatives of 
target groups and sectors has been the absence of a domestic bourgeoisie and/or middle class 
seeking to challenge the state’s economic, social or political dominance – whether motivated 
by democratic ideals or more self-serving material objectives. Consolidated control over the 
commanding heights of the domestic economy and the lead role in offshore investment by 
GLCs, most notably Temasek and the Government of Singapore Investment Corporation, has 
largely resigned domestic companies and professionals to strategies of riding on the coat-tails 
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of state companies.34 Meanwhile, the resources at the disposal of the PAP for punishment and 
reward have been bolstered so that access to jobs, contracts public housing and even 
superannuation is controlled through the PAP state,35 further undermining the propensity and 
structural base for pockets of independent political space. In a theoretical sense, this point has 
some resonance with Brownlee’s emphasis on the structural bases of coalitions sustaining 
authoritarian regimes,36 although the argument here is that this needs to be extended beyond 
consideration of electoral politics. 
 
Representation and NMPs 
While Gandhi found little evidence of representation emanating from inclusive 
authoritarianism in her comprehensive study,37 a brief examination of the most recent NMP 
appointment process underlines a very definite attempt to institutionalize some notion of 
representation within this scheme in Singapore. Importantly, the idea of representation being 
developed here is meant to compete with or supplant the sorts of democratic parliamentary 
representation that Gandhi was searching for.  
The public advertisement calling for NMP nominations in 2006 identified six groups 
to propose candidates: business and industry; labour; the professions; social and community 
service organizations; tertiary institutions; and media, arts and sports groups. Each group had 
a coordinator to seek views and submit names on their behalf. The Speaker of Parliament, 
Abdullah Tarmugi, appointed the coordinators.38 In making their applications, prospective 
NMPs are required to outline a case – in effect, through a short essay – as to their ideas and 
social base. A committee of eight MPs, chaired by Speaker Abdullah Tarmugi, considered 
and interviewed nominees before seeking President SR Nathan to approve recommendations. 
In the 2006 round, there were 47 applications, up significantly from the 37 for the 2004 round 
and well up from the 11 nominations a decade earlier in 1996. 
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This firming up of NMPs as representatives of a sort, rather than just as expert or non-
partisan individuals contributing to public policy debate, recently prompted retired 
government MP Tan Cheng Bock to again condemn the scheme and claim that all his original 
fears had been realized. On 2 December 2006, he wrote an article for The Straits Times 
entitled ‘Danger of sectarian representation’, elaborating on his opposition and arguing that if 
elected MPs are doing their job there is no need for NMPs. Implicit in Tan’s critique is the 
idea that PAP backbenchers were being further marginalized, although the argument can be 
extended. Indeed, the NMP scheme could be seen, in effect, as adding a new flank to the PAP 
– both by bringing into Parliament some members of the state capitalist and establishment 
network and more generally as a source to the government of new ideas. The party and not 
just Parliament has been in transformation. Yet Tan was now a lone government voice of 
public dissent on the NMP scheme.  
If the NMP scheme is now embedded and beyond serious challenge, what form of 
representation then does it involve and what are the implications of this for the political 
regime’s durability? The first matter to pursue here is whether NMPs see themselves as 
representatives. Towards answering this question interviews were conducted with NMPs 
from the last two parliaments. The responses were mixed, suggesting a variety of 
interpretations of their roles and the expectations of them. By way of reinforcement of the 
discussion immediately above, many of the respondents felt that the Select Committee was 
interested in establishing the extent and nature of their links within a functional constituency. 
Thio Li-Ann observed, for example, that ‘they were clearly sounding people out as de facto 
representatives or at least people who could be projected as such’.39 However, to the extent 
that the NMPs regard themselves as representatives this varies between notions of 
representing people, interests and ideas.  
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 Among those respondents to see themselves most clearly and unambiguously in a 
representative role were Edwin Khew and Jessie Phua. The former unequivocally saw 
himself representing local business and had a clear idea of his constituents – members of the 
manufacturing and business community. The Singapore Manufacturers’ Federation (SMF) (of 
which Khew is President) and the Singapore Business Federation (SBF) jointly proposed his 
application. According to Khew, people within the SMF in particular were of the view that 
‘the interests of manufacturing weren’t well represented in Parliament’.40 Interestingly, the 
problem appeared to be attributed in part to the fact that not since Robert Chua, an NMP in 
the eighth Parliament who was chairman of the Singapore Manufacturers’ Association, as it 
was then known, had there been any direct representation of the manufacturing sector. This 
suggests that within this sector at least, NMP appointments are viewed as strategic.  
Consistent with Khew’s conception of himself representing a constituency, he has 
established groups of major business leaders within the SMF and the SBF who chair various 
committees to receive and review input from the business community. These groups are 
conversant with the routine of parliamentary procedures and schedules, and thus ensure 
recommended questions are supplied two weeks before any parliamentary sitting. There is 
also a screening process by small groups. In Parliament, Khew has thus served as a conduit 
for concerns within the local business community. He has also been a particularly vigorous 
advocate of Singapore as hub for environmentally sustainable technologies and contributor to 
most major debates. 
 Phua also became an NMP against a background of heavy involvement in established 
organizations, although in her case grassroots sporting bodies. She sees herself as 
representing the sporting fraternity and advancing the opportunities and social benefits of 
sport – especially for youth.41 The sporting and business fraternities were the two main 
supporters in her eight nomination letters to the Select Committee. Her essay submitted to the 
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Committee was entitled ‘The Average Woman of Singapore’, emphasizing that she would be 
the only non-university graduate should she be appointed. In contrast with Khew, though, 
Phua indicated that she did not engage in any structured process for ascertaining the concerns 
and interests of the sporting fraternity but relied instead on a wealth of direct experience with 
those involved in sport. Thus far in Parliament, Phua has been closely disciplined to raising 
issues related to sport. However, she did speak on the controversial issue of ministerial 
salaries during that debate, which she explained many people had approached her about.42  
 A theme evident in other responses was a claim not so much to representing a clearly 
defined constituency with whom some sort of structured or even unstructured engagement 
occurred, as a claim to be representing views and interests neglected by the political parties. 
Geh Min, for example, did not hesitate to assert that she represents ‘environmental issues and 
interests’ and other issues neglected by the parties.43 Technically, the Singapore Medical 
Association nominated Geh, but the nominees were fellow medical professionals Jennifer Lee 
and Kanwaljit Soin, friends with whom she had previously worked, among other things, on 
challenging female quotas for medical school entry. However, it was environmentalism that 
Geh championed in her application and during her term in Parliament she raised such issues 
as the illegal wildlife trade and animal rights. Although she was President of the NSS, she 
explained that she regularly received solicited and unsolicited feedback from members and 
her own network but there was no routine process of consultation with groups or individuals. 
For Geh, the inability to seriously claim representation of identifiable constituents brought 
advantages and disadvantages. ‘NMPs don’t have any ground to stand on if they take a 
confrontational stance’ observed Geh, since they weren’t voted by an electorate.44 By the 
same token: ‘The luxury of being an NMP is bringing up issues that are relevant but won’t 
win many votes, such as issues of interest to the NSS, which enjoys niche support’.45  
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 Goh Chong Chia, a professional architect who was also an NMP in the ninth 
Parliament, echoed this perspective. He had been nominated by a professional body and saw 
himself ‘representing views not readily expressed in Parliament by either the PAP or the 
opposition,’ emphasizing how ‘NMPs are not beholden to anyone and are not seeking re-
election from a constituency, they are at liberty to pursue those interests’.46 Much like Geh, 
Goh saw himself as having experiences and networks that could not be conceived of as 
constituencies, but which availed him of perspectives and information useful to Parliament. 
He was a past President of the Singapore Institute of Architects, also chairman at the time of 
the Physical Development Feedback Group working on housing, transport and environmental 
issues and had close links with the Handicapped Society, whose concerns about urban design 
were a matter of professional interest to Goh. All of this meant he had a network of contacts 
and engagement around issues related to his application to enter Parliament, but nothing 
systematic in terms of consultation with parties potentially affected by the ideas being 
advanced in Parliament. While his contributions to Parliament generally focussed on the 
issues signalled in his application, he did not see himself as limited to those and acted 
accordingly.  
 Two NMPs in the eleventh Parliament located in Table 1 under ‘Youth’, Siew Kum 
Hong and Eunice Olsen, have even less structured avenues for consulting any supposed 
constituents. Yet Siew sees himself ‘representing a specific segment of the population – 
young, late 20s, English-educated, western in outlook, fairly liberal, Internet savvy’.47 Siew 
thinks the select Committee saw him ‘representing the internet bloggers, the Mr Brown set’.48 
In his letter of application he did not purport to represent anyone, but he signalled helping 
people on low incomes, consumer rights, animal welfare, intellectual property and privacy as 
the issues of most concern to him. Yet in Parliament he has spoken on a wide range of issues, 
gaining most notoriety for introducing a petition with 2,341 signatures to repeal Penal Code 
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377A to decriminalize homosexuality. This was something that gay groups had lobbied him 
on. Olsen concedes that technically she cannot represent anybody but she nevertheless 
‘would like to represent the thoughts of the youth’ in particular. She maintains that her role in 
the media and her music affords informal opportunities to gauge youth issues.49 In practice, 
she has spoken on a surprisingly diverse range of topics, including on GLC accountability.  
Interestingly, both Siew and Olsen were invited to apply to become NMPs by 
government ministers, underlining the importance the government attaches to this new 
category of appointments. Such initiatives also resonate with an observation by another 
former NMP that ‘NMPs are for the government’s use. They do the feedback for you.’50  
 Academic lawyer Thio Li-Ann provided one of the clearest articulations from an 
NMP about the distinctiveness of the role as ‘representative’. According to her, NMPs 
provide ‘indirect representation’ and she sees herself as representing issues rather than people 
as constituents. Invited by the President of the National University of Singapore to be 
nominated, the issues she expressly came to Parliament to advance were constitutional 
matters and human rights. Her application essay, entitled ‘Why I’m Willing to Eat My 
Words’, discussed constitutional matters in general and the Elected Presidency in particular. 
However, as with some other NMPs, Thio did not think she should be confined to the areas 
identified in her application and could exercise ‘a roving commission’.51 Thio made 
absolutely no claim to consulting anyone on the matters raised in Parliament and she has been 
true to her claims in both pursuing human rights issues and branching out to other topics. 
Indeed, although she has pursued issues about Singapore’s international treaty obligations, 
changes to the Constitutional Entrenchment Provision and detentions under the Internal 
Security Act, she has gained most media attention from her opposition to the proposed 
decriminalization of homosexuality initiated by fellow NMP, Siew.  
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This admittedly limited sample of NMP respondents on the extent and nature of their 
roles as representatives nevertheless highlights two points. First, there is no uniform 
conception among them on whether they see themselves as representative or, if they do, how. 
Arguably the ambiguity of the scheme invites and promotes this variation. Second, few of the 
respondents have at their disposal developed structures of feedback and consultation to 
facilitate engagement with large numbers of citizens. Yet through the Select Committee it is 
clear that the PAP has been fostering the idea of NMPs as representatives, albeit in a 
functional sense rather than in terms of accountability to citizens. What appears to matter to 
the government is that NMPs conform in some way with those elements emphasized in 
Burke’s account of representatives: substantive virtue and expert knowledge. That expert 
knowledge, though, may increasingly extend beyond technical expertise to include a good 
feel for views and aspirations among sections of the population not adequately incorporated 
into the PAP state through other means.  
  
Making a Difference? What Sort? 
After 18 years, only one piece of legislation initiated by an NMP has been approved in 
Parliament – Walter Woon’s Maintenance of Parents Bill in 1994 – and a mere handful of 
other pieces of legislation have been NMP-initiated. As we have seen above, former NMP 
Kanwaljit Soin maintains that the substantive content of her failed legislation nevertheless 
found partial expression in other reforms taken up by the government. In interviews, a few 
NMPs made similar though less substantial claims to indirect public policy influence, such as 
improvements to public transport provisions for the disabled and the establishment of a Clean 
Energy Programme Office. Overall, though, the record of tangible policy impact is 
unimpressive. Nevertheless, the numbers of people seeking appointments or accepting 
nominations for appointment rises. Why? 
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 Soin’s views on the scheme offering at least some opportunity for greater political 
engagement without the risks associated with formal political opposition may well be shared 
by other NMPs. However, a recurring theme from NMP interviews was the assertion that the 
scheme enabled issues to be raised that are not taken up with any seriousness, if at all, by 
political parties. Included here are environmentalism, feminism, gay rights, treatment of 
foreign workers, urban design and constitutional reform issues. These might be described as 
middle class or socially progressive issues, which neither the ruling party nor the opposition 
parties can easily embrace without risk of alienating the socially conservative Chinese-
speaking working class, or so-called ‘HDB Heartlanders.’ So while the political timidity of 
the middle class is in itself a constraint, the building of alliances with the emerging middle 
class forces around some of the issues important to them has not been a priority for 
opposition parties. Consequently, these issues have been finding expression through the NMP 
scheme. Ironically, the technocratic approach to politics fostered by the PAP through the 
NMP scheme affords these issues legitimacy not readily available through the existing parties 
– even if that legitimacy hasn’t translated into significant policy reform.  
 The gulf between some of the more socially progressive NMPs and the opposition 
parties was poignantly highlighted in the debate over the Penal Code (Amendment) Bill 
section 377A, initiated by NMP Siew Kum Hong in his attempt to have homosexuality 
decriminalized. Although the Singapore Progressive Party leader Chiam See Tong spoke 
briefly on the Bill, he made no comment whatsoever about 377A. Meanwhile, Workers’ Party 
leader, Low Thia Khiang, failed to speak at all on the Bill. Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong 
noted Low’s failure to enter the debate, using it to bolster his argument that ‘Chinese-
speaking Singaporeans are not strongly engaged, either for removing section 377A or against 
removing section 377A’.52 Indeed, arguably this particular episode revealed just how useful 
the NMP scheme can be for the PAP, providing a space for such debate without ever having 
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to seriously entertain real change. It serves the PAP well that these issues are not embraced 
by the opposition, lest its failure to do likewise cost it middle class support.  
 To be sure, the difficulty of alliances between the expanding middle class and 
opposition parties do not rest principally on the above differences. Material redistribution to 
address social inequalities have historically been a key plank in the social democratic 
alliances across working and middle classes in other countries but the latter has shown little 
or no enthusiasm in Singapore for such an agenda. Crucially, the scope for this developing is 
not aided by the fragmentation and compartmentalization of political debate encouraged by 
the NMP scheme. First, the scheme promotes the idea of politics as a set of public policy 
choices, which obscures the fundamentally normative nature of politics – the recognition of 
which is more conducive to an acceptance of the need to develop alliances rather than rely 
solely on the logical power of argument to prevail. Second, through the NMP scheme the 
issues to be represented are not only, in effect, shaped by the Select Committee, but 
individuals and social organizations are drawn into a process of atomization as they each 
work away on their respective, specific agendas. For this reason, former NMP Goh Chong 
Chia’s hope that the scheme will prove ‘a transitional institution, not an alternative to a civil 
society’ appears optimistic.53 Indeed, it is precisely the contribution of the NMP scheme in 
discouraging the formation of alliances between independent organizations in joint political 
action – outside PAP controlled institutions – that renders it most significant to the project of 
authoritarian renewal.   
 
Conclusion  
While many observers emphasize the absence of democratic transition in Singapore to 
highlight political continuity, there has been significant change to the regime to accommodate 
new social forces and contain tensions associated with the city-state’s particular path of 
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capitalist development. In this phase of authoritarianism, political participation is of 
heightened importance to the process by which contestation is obstructed. This includes new 
structures and notions of representation meant to limit politics to exercises in problem solving 
governance rather than more explicit debate and challenge over normative policy choices.   
Importantly, the NMP scheme through which the PAP has most explicitly sought to 
develop new forms of representation to stymie political competition has met with a degree of 
acceptance – especially among business and professional classes generally denied 
opportunities for collective, independent political space. This must be understood in its 
political economy context, which is pivotal to the ‘formula for successful and stable 
inclusionary authoritarianism’ which Geddes observes as so generally elusive.54 
Consolidating state capitalism in Singapore has limited the scope for independent bases of 
power and shored up the resources of the PAP state and citizens’ direct and indirect 
dependence on it. Meanwhile, the technocratic worldviews and assumptions of an ever-more 
powerful and increasingly homogenous class of politico-bureaucratic elites not only permeate 
and penetrate deep into existing institutions, but now also drive the direction of new ones.  
Significantly, although the state capitalist trajectory of Singapore under the PAP is not 
a general feature of authoritarian rule, there are some points of intersection with the political 
economies of other countries in Southeast Asia and elsewhere. This includes the legacy of 
Western support for repressive governments to shore up capitalism during the Cold War. This 
has meant that civil societies have often had to be built from low bases and in a context of 
late industrialization under globalized capitalism that has not been conducive to strong, 
independent trade unions linked to reformist political parties. Much contemporary middle 
class political activism is expressed, therefore, through NGOs rather than via broader social 
movements involving labour/middle class coalitions and is potentially vulnerable to other 
institutional alternatives, as in Singapore. Crucially, it is not just the choices of incumbent 
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authoritarian elites that are shaped by political economy relationships, but the choices and 
modes of political opposition. 
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